Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 44
Number 2 Winter 2011 - Symposium: Rebooting
California: Initiatives, Conventions &
Government Reform

Article 13

1-1-2011

I Am He as You Are He as You Are Me: Being Able to Be Yourself,
Protecting the Integrity of Identity Online
Wesley Burrell
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, wesley.burrell@lls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wesley Burrell, I Am He as You Are He as You Are Me: Being Able to Be Yourself, Protecting the Integrity of
Identity Online, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 705 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss2/13

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

I AM HE AS YOU ARE HE AS YOU ARE ME:
BEING ABLE TO BE YOURSELF,
PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF
IDENTITY ONLINE
Wesley Burrell*
Arguing for an individual’s right to integrity of identity online, this
Note advocates rolling back broad immunity for Internet service
providers (ISPs) under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act as
interpreted in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. Exploring the theoretical
foundation and modern application of the right of publicity, this Note
reasons that traditional right-to-privacy notions support a right to
control one’s identity online, recognition of which is necessary in the
Web 2.0 era. Because ISPs are the greatest beneficiaries of Web 2.0’s
identity-driven structure and are in the best position to aid users in
regulating their online identities, ISPs must be made to bear a greater
portion of the burden to protect users and maintain an environment of
safe interaction online. This Note concludes with a proposal for
accomplishing this.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to extend a
very special thanks to my wife Talene and my Mom and Dad. I would also like to thank Professor
John Nockleby for his time and guidance, as well as my family and loved ones for their support
and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, Americans have seen an unprecedented
increase in integration between the online and offline worlds.
Internet usage is increasingly ubiquitous,1 its nature more and more
interactive and participatory.2 The twentieth-century Internet was
conceived primarily as an information-providing platform with users
on the receiving end.3 Online activity was predominately fit to that
conception—akin to viewing television or reading a book. Today, by
contrast, users log more online hours using interactive social media
than they spend passively receiving prepackaged information and
entertainment.4 They are communicating, self-expressing, and
contributing to the development of culture and community, and they
are doing so with more ease and frequency than they ever did
before.5 Beneficially, this allows them to engage with society, enrich
themselves, and impact others like never before.6 But there is a dark
side as well. This shift in Internet usage brings an attendant shift in
the relationship between the virtual world online and the real world
offline, which increases the risk and danger associated with Internet
use. Current law does not provide adequate protection against this
dark side.
To illustrate the dark side of the interconnected online and
offline worlds, consider the facts of Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.7 In early
2005, the unsuspecting Cecilia Barnes began to receive phone calls
and emails from strangers soliciting sex.8 They called her at work
and even solicited her in person.9 They assumed that she wanted the
1. See United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (noting
that in 2009, 74.1 percent of the U.S. population used the Internet); Christina Warren, Average
Internet User Now Spends 68 Hours Per Month Online, MASHABLE (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://mashable.com/2009/10/14/net-usage-nielsen.
2. Enid Burns, More Time Spent Online Communicating Than Getting Entertained, CLICKZ
(Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.clickz.com/3632986.
3. Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next
Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/6228.
4. Enid Burns, Study: Social Media’s Hot, Entertainment’s Not, CLICKZ (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://www.clickz.com/3632063.
5. Burns, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); infra note 27.
7. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
8. Id. at 1098.
9. Id.

710

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:707

attention, that she had requested it. Finally, Barnes discovered the
cause: someone had posted a personal ad soliciting casual sex on
Yahoo! Personals (“Yahoo”) with her name and contact
information.10 The ad had been posted without her knowledge or
permission and was viewable by Internet users all over the world.11 It
displayed nude photos of her taken without her knowledge and listed
personal information including her email, work address, and phone
number.12 The anonymous poster had also conducted online
discussions in Yahoo chat rooms.13 Posing as Barnes, the poster
propositioned men and directed them to the fake personal ad for
further information and interaction.14 Using Barnes’s fraudulently
misappropriated identity, the poster actively solicited strangers to
unwittingly harass Barnes.15
Upon discovery of the fraudulent profile, and having no other
recourse against the anonymous poster, Barnes followed Yahoo’s
official policy for requesting removal of web content.16 She mailed
Yahoo a copy of her photo ID, a signed statement denying her
involvement with the profile, and a request for Yahoo to remove the
profile.17 Nevertheless, the profile remained.18 For months, Barnes
mailed requests for removal with no results.19 Yahoo did not respond
until a local news program prepared to air a report on the story.20
Yahoo’s Director of Communications called Barnes personally and
asked her to fax copies of all previous requests for removal.21 The
director promised to “take care of it” personally.22 Barnes faxed the
correspondence and, relying on the director’s reassurance, took no
further action.23 Yet, two months passed, the profile remained active,
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098–99.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
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and harassment continued.24 Not until Barnes sued Yahoo did the
profile disappear.25
Sadly, Barnes’s predicament is not an anomaly.26 This form of
harassment is common in today’s online culture.27 Even children
have been its victims.28 But harassment and the danger of assault are
not the only consequences of identity misappropriation. Whenever
online impersonators post unauthorized images, unapproved personal
information, or other fraudulent source-identifying content, such
postings are potentially detrimental to a victim’s online persona and
can have dangerous and destructive effects offline as well.29
Additionally, because many Internet applications now track an
individual’s online identity to increase functionality and precision,30
dilution resulting from misappropriation can impair the functionality
of user-driven applications and, in some cases, drive victims offline
entirely.31

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Eric Goldman, 47 USC 230 Trifecta of Cases—Friendfinder, e360insight, iBrattleboro,
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2008, 10:27 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2008/04/47_usc_230_trifecta.htm (“Fake dating profiles have been the source of a fair amount of
230 litigation . . . .”); see, e.g., Fighter Team, Internet Harassment & Revenge Is a Crime,
EXPOSING ONLINE PREDATORS & CYBERPATHS (Aug. 7, 2010, 7:21 PM),
http://cyberpaths.blogspot.com/2009/02/internet-harassment-revenge-is-crime.html (recounting
the story of “Pilar Stofega, 34, [who] spent hours crafting fake profiles about her ex-boyfriend’s
wife and posting them online”).
27. See, e.g., Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-1526, 2005 WL 3640448, at *1
(W.D. La. 2005) (representing a case with facts nearly identical to those of Barnes); Telling the
Difference Between Flaming, Cyber-Bullying and Harassment and Cyberstalking (A Guide for
Law Enforcement), STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/lawenforcement/
telling_the_difference.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (listing as examples of cyber-bullying:
“[r]egistering [someone else’s] name and setting up a bash Web site or profile,” “[m]asquerading
as [someone else] for any purpose,” and “[p]osting [someone’s] . . . cell phone number online to
encourage abuse and increase . . . charges”).
28. Christina Chatalian, Cyber Stalker Terrorizing Family, CNYCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 15,
2008, 7:10 PM), http://www.cnycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=96646 (describing a 2008 case
where an anonymous stranger stole pictures of a woman’s twelve-year-old daughter and posted
them on the Internet in a fake profile that included her home address, personal information, and a
professed desire to be raped by a stranger).
29. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 78–80 (2009)
(citing cases where women’s names and images were purposefully posted to white supremacist
watch sites to affect their employment opportunities).
30. Christopher Mims, Who Controls Identity on the Web?, TECH. REV. (May 13, 2010),
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/25298/?a=f.
31. Citron, supra note 29, at 101.
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While victims have sought to protect themselves against such
violations by suing for conventional right-to-privacy torts,32 the
strong protection of anonymous web posters and broad immunity for
Internet service providers (ISPs) and website operators, or online
service providers (OSPs), render traditional torts toothless. The lack
of effective recourse against such misappropriation chills public
discourse online, interferes with user-driven network advancements,
and generally disrupts the increasing use of identity-syncing
technologies. As a result, identity misappropriation hinders the utility
and development of the Internet as a whole. It thus runs contrary to
the societal good of a robust Internet that Congress expressly intends
to promote.33 Nonetheless, current law fails to adequately protect
Internet users and the integrity of their online identities.
Management of Internet content is the central concern in
protecting the integrity of identity online.34 The principal law
governing Internet content management is § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230 grants ISPs
immunity from publisher liability for content posted by third parties,
stating that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”35 The 1997
Fourth Circuit ruling in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.36 construed
§ 230 immunity broadly.37 The court there read § 230’s grant of
immunity to encompass not only publisher liability but also noticebased distributor liability.38 Subsequent to Zeran, courts have
generally adopted its reasoning and applied broad immunity to both
ISPs and OSPs, shielding them from nearly all liability with respect
32. See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D.N.H. 2008)
(discussing plaintiff bringing various privacy tort claims, including invasion of privacy,
defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of right to
publicity).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (“It is the policy of the United States—(1) to promote
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other
interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services . . . .”).
34. See id. § 230(b).
35. Id. § 230(c)(1).
36. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 332–33.
38. Id. at 332 (“The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law.”).
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to content posted by third parties.39 Such broad immunity leaves
victims of identity infringement, such as Barnes, with no means to
compel ISPs or OSPs to remove tortious or misappropriating content
from their websites.
Furthermore, ISPs have little incentive to collect and maintain
the Internet protocol (IP) addresses40 of anonymous posters who may
have posted infringing material on their websites.41 Those ISPs that
do maintain this data routinely clear their records, some as frequently
as every sixty days.42 Thus, victims have a very limited time during
which to compel an ISP to disclose a third-party poster’s identity,
and they often fail in their efforts to do so.43 The resulting system
grants ISPs all but total immunity, grants anonymous harassers a sort
of de facto immunity, and leaves victims to absorb the expenses and
injuries that result from the infringing posts. To deter identity
infringement and uphold the societal interest in a robust Internet,
users must be granted legal leverage against ISPs to compel the
removal of infringing posts and to deter third-party posters. This
leverage would be both consistent with Congress’s aim and intent
that underlie the CDA and is consistent with the plain language of
§ 230, which does not address notice-based distributor liability.
The current legal scheme is premised on an understanding of the
Internet that is nearly fifteen years out of date. When the Zeran court
interpreted publisher liability to include notice-based distributor
liability, it did so with a different Internet in mind. Unlike 1997’s
Internet, today’s Internet is ubiquitous and integral to contemporary
39. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
40. “An IP address is a unique, electronic number which specifically identifies a device
(often a computer) connected to the Internet.” Tara E. Lynch, Good Samaritan or Defamation
Defender? Amending the Communications Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of § 230 . . .
Without Expanding ISP Liability, 19 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 18 (2008) (citation
omitted), available at http://sstlr.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/lynch-final-version.pdf.
41. Citron, supra note 29, at 118 (noting that broad immunity “eliminate[s] incentives for
better behavior” as operators have no reason to “collect and retain the identities of posters”).
42. Where
Is
Your
Data?,
ISP
DATA
RETENTION
(July 7,
2008),
http://whereismydata.wordpress.com/tag/isp-data-retention; see also, e.g., Lynch, supra note 40,
at 15 (discussing how the plaintiff in Zeran could not identify the John Doe who defamed him
because AOL failed to maintain adequate user records).
43. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Expedited Discovery, Doe
I v. Ciolli, 611 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2008) (No. 3:07-cv-909(CFD)) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs’
Memorandum],
available
at
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/
WSJ_DEF_MemoofLawreM_012408.pdf.
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culture.44 The Zeran court could not have anticipated the
participatory nature of twenty-first century cyberspace and the
degree to which identity is an integral component of its functionality.
Today, “network effects from user contributions are the key,” and a
multi-user, collaborative approach to content creation and
development is the model for success on the Internet and with other
networking technologies—a paradigm that has been dubbed
“Web 2.0.”45 It is not merely a matter of the more the merrier. In
today’s online environment, interactivity and the participation of
myriad diverse users are central to the Internet’s success.46 User
security and autonomy of identity are therefore of fundamental
importance. The law must protect users or it will impede the
Internet’s continuing development by failing to facilitate plentiful
participation.47
This Note proposes solutions to bring online protection up to
date while maintaining an appropriate degree of ISP immunity. This
proposal requires minimal legislation. It argues that the reality and
trajectory of current technologies and the structure and nature of the
Web 2.0 Internet compel a reconsideration of the dominant
interpretation of § 230 of the CDA with regard to the original
congressional intent. Because of the unique character of online
identity and its impact on real-world persona, courts must recognize
and protect the right to integrity of identity online in the same way
that they have protected the rights to intellectual property online.
Finally, this Note argues that Congress must enact uniform standards
to ensure accountability for third-party posting online. Without such
protections, individuals will remain subject to threat and continue to
bear the bulk risk for participation in the Internet’s virtual world,
causing online culture and its marketplace of ideas to suffer.
44. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The
ubiquity of the Internet is undisputed.”).
45. O’Reilly, supra note 3 (emphasis omitted).
46. See id.
47. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 154 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most
scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran’s analysis of § 230 is flawed, in that the court
ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in
mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes. We share that view.” (citation omitted)), rev’d, 146
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); see also Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293–94,
296–97 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding operators of adult web communities could not be held liable for
damage caused by online profile even though plaintiff suffered “emotional distress, including
anxiety over the lingering effect the false profile”).
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Part II will give a statement of the existing law addressing (A)
privacy and publicity rights for individuals online; (B) ISP liability
for third-party content; and (C) subpoena laws governing protection
of anonymity and the disclosure of a third party’s identity. Part III
addresses the existing law’s inadequacies and its failure to protect
user identity online. It then discusses (A) the impact on the law
discussed in Part II as it applies after the development of the Internet
from the “Walled Garden” web to Web 2.0; (B) anonymity under the
current law and the problems and benefits of anonymous speech
when it comes to online harassment; and (C) the specific effect of
existing law on victims of online harassment. In Part IV, this Note
proposes changes to the existing law that will better enable
individuals to protect their identities both online and, by extension,
offline. Specifically, this part (A) argues from theory and common
law for the development of an online right to integrity of identity; (B)
proposes opening distributor liability to ISPs as an exception to
§ 230 immunity in the particular case of a violation of an individual’s
right to integrity of identity; (C) proposes a notice and takedown
“safe harbor” policy for the integrity of identity exception to § 230
immunity; (D) discusses safeguards to protect speech and limit abuse
of the notice and takedown policy; (E) argues for limits to online
anonymity, proposes the application of a uniform subpoena policy
for cases of violations of the right to integrity of identity, and
discusses the privacy and free speech concerns that may stem from
such limits to anonymity. In Part V, this Note discusses the judicial
and legislative steps necessary to implement the proposed policies.
Part VI concludes.
II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
A. Privacy and Publicity Rights Online
1. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is the only right to identity that courts
have recognized as an exception to § 230 immunity.48 Some courts
have held that the right of publicity is an intellectual property right49
48. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301. However, not all courts recognize this exception.
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
right of publicity claims are barred by § 230).
49. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–25; see also, e.g., Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288,
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that fits within the intellectual property exception to § 230.50 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the right of publicity as an
“[a]ppropriation of one’s name or likeness to another’s advantage.”51
The general prima facie case has three elements: (1) the defendant
used the plaintiff’s name, portrait, or picture; (2) for purposes of
trade or advertising; (3) without written consent.52 Its scope varies by
state, but “most states now protect name, voice, signature,
photograph, and likeness, almost all facets of [an individual],
including persona.”53
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.,54 the court held that a right
of publicity claim is an exception to § 230 immunity.55 There, a
woman discovered a profile on a sex site identifying her by name and
listing other accurate biographical information.56 It included a nude
photo with enough resemblance to her that she could be “reasonably
identified.”57 She sued the ISPs Friendfinder Network, Inc. and
Various, Inc. on multiple tort causes of action.58 Citing § 230, the
New Hampshire district judge dismissed all but the right of publicity
claim.59 He held that “the right of publicity is a widely recognized
intellectual property right” and that it is subject to the exception for
intellectual property claims.60
302 (“[T]he right of publicity is a widely recognized intellectual property right.” (quoting
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006)); cf. Almeida, 456 F.3d at
1323 n.4 (declining to decide whether § 230(e)(2) immunizes ISPs from right of publicity claims
but noting “the right of publicity does not fit neatly into the category of tort-based lawsuits from
which Congress sought to immunize interactive service providers”).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); see also Eric J. Goodman, A
National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 227, 232 (1999) (noting that the right of publicity is recognized directly in the
common law of sixteen states with corollaries in the right to privacy or unfair competition in most
others).
52. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307, 308 (N.Y. 1984).
53. Oren J. Warshavsky, The Expanding Right of Publicity, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
Feb. 2006, at 32, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&
artMonth=September&artYear=2008&EntryNo=4209.
54. 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
55. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
56. Id. at 292.
57. Id. (noting that despite the resemblance, plaintiff claimed photo was not of her).
58. Id. at 291.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Prior to and contrary to this 2008 ruling, the Ninth Circuit had
held in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC61 that “[a]s a practical matter,
inclusion of rights protected by state law within the ‘intellectual
property’ exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of
immunity provided by the CDA.”62 As a result, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the right of publicity, trade defamation, unfair competition,
and dilution, among other state intellectual property rights, were not
exempted by § 230(e)(2).63 The court in Friendfinder explicitly
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, stating that the plain language
of § 230(e)(2) exempted right of publicity claims and that this was
“the general consensus before . . . Perfect 10.”64 It additionally noted
that allowing such claims to survive would not “have a ‘devastating’
impact on the [I]nternet,” and that “both the [I]nternet and so-called
‘e-commerce’ remain alive and well, and show no signs of imminent
collapse.”65 The Ninth Circuit has determined that § 230 immunizes
ISPs against the right of publicity, but in most jurisdictions this
remains an open question.
The right of publicity grew out of the right to privacy,66 which
was originally devised to protect an individual’s right to be “let
alone.”67 The progenitors of the right to privacy identified the
emotional harm caused by unwanted public exposure and argued that
it should be a compensable injury.68 They argued that privacy rights
were neither contractual nor property rights but rather “rights as
against the world.”69 The right of publicity was an expansion of the
right to privacy, covering cases where public figures sought relief for
unwanted public exposure.70 Finding damage due to infringement of
the right to be “let alone” seemed nonsensical when applied to
61. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 1119.
63. Id.
64. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
65. Id.
66. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 167 (1993) (“The right of publicity was created not so much from
the right of privacy as from frustration with it.”).
67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
200 n.2 (1890).
68. Id. at 193, 197.
69. Id.
70. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225, 228 (2005).
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plaintiffs, such as celebrities, who had made a career of seeking
public exposure.71 Thus, the right of publicity was based on
appropriation of one’s identity rather than on its public exposure, and
it is distinguishable from other privacy rights in that respect—that is,
the basis of harm is in the loss of economic associative value in the
individual’s identity.72 But despite the right of publicity’s basis in the
underlying market value of identity, the majority of courts do not
distinguish plaintiffs based on that value.73 The majority view is that
“non-celebrities have a right of publicity” despite the very low
economic associative value of their identities.74 Likewise, many
commentators suggest that Lockean labor theory75 is the proper
theoretical mechanism for justifying right of publicity claims and
distinguishing claimants.76 Yet this theory, though generally
accepted, is problematic when compared to the functional application
of the right of publicity discussed in Part IV.A.
2. Defamation, Libel, and Intermediary Liability
Defamation predates the right to privacy, and it is also
implicated in most cases of online identity misappropriation.77
Contrary to disagreement about § 230’s application to the right of
publicity, courts agree that § 230 immunizes ISPs against defamation
claims.78 The elements of a defamation claim vary slightly but
usually consist of “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third-party; (3) fault
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:16 (2d ed. 2000).
74. Id.
75. McKenna, supra note 70, at 230.
76. See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 388 (1999) (arguing that the theoretical basis for the right of publicity is that economic
value in identity should be allocated to a claimant because the value is primarily the result of the
claimant’s own labor).
77. E.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
78. Ben Quarmby, Protection from Online Libel: A Discussion and Comparison of the Legal
and Extrajudicial Recourses Available to Individual and Corporate Plaintiffs, 42 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 275, 282 n.24 (2008); cf. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2004) (“We
agree with appellants that the statute cannot be deemed to abrogate the common law principle that
one who republishes defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to liability if he or
she knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character. By construing section 230 as
conferring an absolute immunity, the trial court erred.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)),
rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
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amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4)
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”79
Defamation law recognizes the torts of libel, for defamatory
statements published in a fixed medium, and slander, for spoken
defamatory statements.80 Because online speech occurs in a fixed
medium, defamatory online speech is considered libel.81
Under libel law, there are two ways to hold an intermediary
liable. The first is publisher liability,82 which holds that “one who
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to
liability as if he had originally published it.”83 Traditionally publisher
liability applied to newspaper publishers, book publishers,
broadcasters, and the like.84 Courts applied liability to these
publishers because the publishers commonly had a good deal of
editorial control and discretion over content.85 This editorial review
process has resulted in a public perception that the publishers or
broadcasters had “adopted the [defamatory] statements as [their]
own.”86 Section 230 expressly provides immunity to ISPs from
liability as a publisher.87
The alternative form of intermediary libel liability is distributor
liability. Distributor liability differs from publisher liability in that
distributors are considered passive in the conveyance of the
defamatory statement since there is no editorial process.88 Thus, a
distributor is liable for the transmission of a defamatory statement
only if the distributor “knows or has reason to know of its
defamatory character.”89 Section 230 does not explicitly provide

79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
80. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 934, 1421 (8th ed. 2004).
81. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1164–65 (2006) (noting that some scholars argue online speech,
particularly blogging, should be regarded as slander rather than libel).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
83. Id.
84. Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 144 (2008).
85. Id. at 144–45.
86. Id. at 145 (alteration in original).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977).
89. Id.
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immunity to ISPs from distributor liability. Indeed, it does not
mention distributor liability.
Finally, common carriers such as telephone companies have
traditionally been immune from liability.90 Common carriers usually
cannot control the statements transmitted over their networks and are
required to serve all customers.91 Therefore, courts have typically
held that common carriers cannot be liable for the defamatory
statements of others made over their networks.92 Despite some
similar characteristics, ISPs are not considered common carriers
because they can refuse to serve customers.93
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.94 established the contemporary
interpretation of CDA immunity, granting broad protection from
liability to ISPs.95 The court went beyond the plain language of the
statute in interpreting the breadth of immunity and construed it to
include immunity for distributors as well as publishers.96 Thus, under
Zeran, even when an ISP or OSP has notice of tortious content on its
server or webpage, it has no obligation to remove that content.97
Unlike the right to privacy and right of publicity, defamation did
not develop as a positive right to be “let alone” or to control one’s
identity; rather, it developed as a negative right against “an assault on
a person’s reputation,” which was considered “an assault on the
entire community.”98 The First Amendment does not protect
defamatory speech.99 Nonetheless, First Amendment protections
compel substantial limits on state defamation laws to protect against
the possible chilling effect on speech that such laws may engender.100
This policy consideration contributes to courts’ reasoning that § 230

90. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 145.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 146.
94. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 332.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Kate Silbaugh, Comment, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Name: Nondefamatory
Negligent Injury to Reputation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 866 (1992).
99. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
100. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 159.
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ought to be construed as broadly as possible in the defamation
realm.101
B. Section 230 of the CDA and ISP Immunity
The CDA was passed in response to rising concerns about the
availability of pornography online as the Internet developed.102 It
took two divergent approaches to policing online content: (1) a direct
set of government-enforced criminal limitations on online activity,
which the Supreme Court struck down within a year of the statute’s
enactment;103 and (2) a hands-off, Internet exceptionalist approach of
§ 230, which survives today.104 Congress passed § 230 for two stated
reasons: first, to protect “Good Samaritan[]” ISPs and OSPs “who
take[] steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers”; and second, to establish a policy against online content
regulation by the federal government.105
There are two immunity provisions in § 230.106 The first protects
providers or users of Internet services (ISPs or OSPs) from treatment
as a publisher or a speaker with regard to information posted by
another content provider.107 The second gives immunity to providers
or users who make a good faith effort to restrict others’ access to
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable” content.108 Section 230 was passed as a
direct response to the ruling in Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services, Co.,109 where an ISP was held liable as a publisher because
it had been vetting its online content of obscene materials.110 The
statute was passed specifically to overrule Stratton-Oakmont, in the
101. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts construing § 230
have recognized as critical in applying the statute the concern that lawsuits could threaten the
‘freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330)).
102. Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?: Lessons from
the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 249 (2007).
103. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 885 (1997).
104. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 102, at 251–52.
105. 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Sen. Cox).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
107. Id. § 230(c)(1).
108. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
109. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute,
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137.
110. Id. at *5.
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hopes of encouraging ISPs to pursue their own online-content
regulation and explore methods and technologies for protecting users
from dangerous or obscene content.111 Since its passage § 230,
though initially intended to encourage ISPs to self-regulate, has
become a shield from liability even when ISPs attempt no regulation
whatsoever—immunizing them even when they work against content
regulation of any kind.112
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. was decided a year after Congress
passed the CDA.113 The case concerned postings on an America
Online (AOL) message board that advertised T-shirts with slogans
expressing support for the Oklahoma City Bomber.114 The shirt sales
were fraudulently attributed to Ken Zeran.115 Facing a high volume of
angry calls, and even death threats, Zeran requested that AOL take
down the posts, but despite AOL’s efforts, the posts remained
online.116 Zeran therefore sued AOL for “unreasonable delay” in
removing the posts.117 Zeran attempted to work around § 230
publisher immunity by arguing that AOL was subject to distributor
liability because it had notice of the defamatory posting.118 The court
dismissed Zeran’s argument, however, stating that distributor
liability was “merely a subset . . . of publisher liability, and is
therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”119 The court went on to explain
that in defamation law the distinction between distributors and
publishers relates only to when liability attaches—before or after
notice.120 However, irrespective of when liability attaches, the court
reasoned that any liable intermediary is liable as a publisher; § 230,
therefore, applies to every intermediary ISP.121

111. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
208.
112. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 102, at 252.
113. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
114. Id. at 329.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 328.
118. Id. at 329–31.
119. Id. at 332.
120. Id. at 331–32.
121. Id. at 332 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 113, at 802 (5th ed. 1984)).
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Zeran laid out a three-part test for establishing immunity that
has since become the predominant interpretation of § 230.122 The ISP
must show that (1) it acted as a user or provider of an interactive
computer service; (2) the plaintiff seeks to hold it liable “as the
publisher or speaker” of information furnished “by another
information content provider”; and (3) it was not the “information
content provider” of the content at issue.123 The Zeran court
precluded distributor liability despite the lack of any explicit
statutory language to support this determination and, in so doing,
possibly went beyond Congress’s original intent.124
After Zeran, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the scope of
immunity by expanding the definition of who or what qualifies as an
ISP.125 In Batzel v. Smith,126 the court ruled that “the definition of
‘interactive computer service’ on its face covers ‘any’ information
services or other systems, as long as the service or system allows
‘multiple users’ to access ‘a computer server.’”127 The defendant
intermediary was the manager of an email listserv who had
forwarded allegedly defamatory email messages to the listserv.128 The
court found the listserv manager immune as an ISP under § 230.129
Similarly, in 2006, the California Supreme Court held in Barrett v.
Rosenthal130 that republishing information did not make one an
information content provider.131 It found that although the defendant
had no actual supervisory role in operating the Internet site on which
she had posted an allegedly defamatory email, she was nonetheless
held to be immune as an ISP and OSP.132

122. Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v.
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 586 (2008).
However, the opinion is not without controversy. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142,
154 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran’s
analysis of section 230 is flawed . . .”), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (2006).
123. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
124. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 149–50.
125. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1021.
129. Id. at 1032.
130. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
131. Id. at 515.
132. Id.
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The legislative history does not indicate whether Congress
intended the immunity granted to ISPs to likewise apply to Internet
users, webpage creators, and general posters of third-party-created
content in the sense applied in Barrett.133 Indeed, the Barrett panel
itself noted that “[i]ndividual Internet ‘users’ like Rosenthal . . . are
situated differently from institutional service providers with regard to
some of the principal policy considerations discussed by the Zeran
court and reflected in the Congressional Record.”134 Users are not
faced with the volume of third-party postings that providers are and,
furthermore, self-regulation for users is “far less challenging.”135
Nonetheless, the court extended immunity.
To understand courts’ persistence in broadly construing § 230
immunity, it is important to consider the policy underlying the
CDA’s initial passage. The CDA was enacted in 1996 because
Congress feared that the available communications laws were out of
date and failed to cover the rapidly expanding Internet.136 It was
enacted to regulate indecency on the Internet and originally included
only proactive regulatory measures prohibiting distribution of
obscene materials online to minors.137 Section 230 was proposed for
the same purpose but with a different philosophy—a carrot to the
proactive measures’ stick—to encourage ISPs to take the initiative in
self-regulation of obscene and offensive materials.138 The statute
itself proclaims this intention “to ensure vigorous enforcement of
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”139 In addition to
this policy purpose, Congress also expressed an intention “to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media [and] to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market . . . unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.”140

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Ciolli, supra note 84, at 152.
Barrett, 146 P.3d at 526.
Id.
141 CONG. REC. 15,502 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858–61 (1997).
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (2006).
Id. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
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Following Zeran, courts have interpreted Congress’s intent
behind the CDA solely to favor freedom and deregulation in online
policy, and they have done so at the expense of Congress’s equally
stated intention to fight online obscenity, stalking, and harassment.
As a result, courts have nearly extinguished protections against
online harassment and stalking, and they have allowed the killer
combination of ISP immunity and user anonymity to all but eliminate
safeguards and recourse for online conduct.141 This one-sided policy
results in a “user beware” Internet.
Rather than directly address the problems spawned by broadly
construed § 230 immunity, courts have made exceptions in limited
circumstances.142 However, these exceptions are ineffective to
combat the problem of broad immunity. For example, in Barnes, the
case discussed in this Note’s Introduction, the exception that the
Ninth Circuit established actually weakened user identity protection
with its promissory estoppel exception.143 The court reasoned that
estoppel liability survived § 230 because it was sufficiently distinct
from publisher liability.144 An ISP in the Ninth Circuit now risks
losing § 230 immunity if it discusses the possibility of removing
offensive content with a complaining victim.145 Though this was a
victory for Barnes, it was a blow to future victims of online identity
misappropriation. The ruling in Barnes discourages ISPs from
responding to victims of misappropriation about potentially
infringing or offensive posts lest the ISPs open themselves to

141. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009); Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003).
142. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding an ISP liable for third-party content when its online application form for housing
induced posters to enter unconstitutionally prejudicial content); see also Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc.,
651 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (allowing an exception for state “right of publicity” claims
predicated on the statutory intellectual property exception from § 230(e)(2)). But see Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that immunity must be broadly
construed to ensure courts do not “undermine” the immunity provided by the CDA).
143. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1109. Barnes brought two claims in her complaint against Yahoo:
negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel. Id. at 1098. The court dismissed the first but
permitted the second. Id. at 1105–06, 1109.
144. Id. (noting liability came “not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s
manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happen[ed] to be removal of
material from publication”).
145. Id. at 1107.
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liability.146 In this way, the exception further frustrates victims’
ability to compel ISPs to remove infringing content.
Some commentators have suggested that courts’ tendency to
make exceptions to broad immunity reveals a trend away from
“Internet exceptionalism.”147 The majority opinion in Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com148 states that the Internet is “no longer a
fragile new means of communication,” but that it has “become a
dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which
commerce is conducted,” reaching into “the lives of millions.”149 The
court concluded that, therefore, it “must be careful not to exceed the
scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online
businesses an unfair advantage over their [offline] counterparts.”150
Courts ought to heed this warning and take such precautions.
C. Subpoena Law
As a matter of free speech, authors have a First Amendment
right to remain anonymous.151 In Reno v. ACLU,152 the Supreme
Court confirmed that this protection extends to online speech, noting
that “democratic forums” online would be hindered if users could not
maintain anonymity.153 Consequentially, courts are cautious about
compelling the unmasking of anonymous online posters.
Unfortunately, there is no uniform standard for issuing a subpoena to
an ISP compelling disclosure of a poster’s identity (“John Doe
subpoenas”).154 Different jurisdictions have different tests.155

146. Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances
Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 1307, 1330 (2010).
147. Varty Defterderia, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for § 230
Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 583 (2009) (“The Rooommates.com majority no longer
sees fit to extend the notion of cyber exceptionalism.”).
148. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 1164 n.15.
150. Id.
151. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
152. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
153. Id. at 868.
154. See Jason C. Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and
Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas and ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 299, 245–46 (2008).
155. Id.
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Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in state courts
that have adopted those rules, a victim must discover the identity of a
third-party poster before he or she can proceed with a suit. However,
in the types of cases addressed by this Note, the third-party poster
has been anonymous. Because Rule 26(f) generally requires that the
parties confer before a plaintiff may seek discovery, a victimplaintiff can satisfy this requirement only by filing an ex parte
motion seeking a subpoena compelling the ISP to disclose the
poster’s identity.156 This motion is necessary because an ISP cannot
legally disclose its users’ identities without a court order.157
Most courts require court approval to issue a subpoena to a
fictitiously named John Doe.158 A plaintiff who wishes to subpoena a
John Doe must submit an order to show cause that includes the
reasons that the defendant should be identified.159 Then the
defendant’s ISP informs the defendant of the order, and he or she can
fight it anonymously through his or her attorney if he or she so
chooses.160 Once the plaintiff has submitted the order and the
defendant has had an opportunity to respond, the court will
determine whether the anonymous defendant’s identity should be
disclosed.161 The amount and type of information that the plaintiff
must submit in order to prevail on the motion depends on what
standard the court uses to assess the merits of unmasking.162 There is
great variation in what courts require, and there are seven different
major John Doe subpoena standards that courts have distinctly
identified and used.163 Five of these standards are applicable and will
be discussed here.
In 1999, Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com164 provided
the earliest decision on this issue and developed the first of these
156. See, e.g., McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262–63 (D. Mass. 2006).
157. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) (2006).
158. Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217,
1227 (2007).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1227–33.
163. Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard,
118 YALE L.J. 320, 337, 339 (2008).
164. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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standards.165 The court in Seescandy sought to balance the
defendants’ First Amendment rights against the injured parties’
rights to seek recovery.166 The court also noted that “limiting”
principles must be applied to ensure that plaintiffs are not permitted
to unmask anonymous speakers through frivolous suits simply to
harass or embarrass innocent parties.167 Each subsequent standard
imposed on the issuance of John Doe subpoenas for anonymous
online speakers has sought to balance these factors. How a court
weighs these contravening concerns determines how difficult it will
be for a plaintiff to unmask a Doe defendant and jurisdictions have
balanced these concerns differently resulting in a range of standards.
The early standards that courts issued favored plaintiffs’
interests over protection for anonymous online speakers.168 In
Seescandy, the plaintiff sought a John Doe subpoena to unmask an
anonymous alleged trademark infringer.169 The Seescandy test
required only that the plaintiff (1) show that his or her case was
strong enough to survive a motion to dismiss; (2) show that the
information sought was likely to identify the defendant and,
therefore, was relevant to the claim; and (3) disclose all steps taken
to locate the defendant and show that a good faith effort had been
made to serve the defendant.170 The first two factors of the Seescandy
test, assessing the strength of the plaintiff’s case and the relevance of
the information sought, are also found in each subsequent standard.
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.171
established a second standard that was even more favorable to
plaintiffs than the Seescandy test.172 America Online was the first
notable defamation case to address whether a John Doe subpoena can
be issued to an anonymous Internet poster.173 The court applied a
165. Id. at 573.
166. Id. at 578 (noting that courts must consider “the need to provide injured parties with a
forum in which they may seek redress for grievances,” but stating that “this need must be
balanced against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or
pseudonymously”).
167. Id.
168. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 341.
169. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 575–76.
170. Id. at 578–79.
171. No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d sub nom. Am. Online,
Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
172. Id. at *8.
173. Lynch, supra note 40, at 19.
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three-pronged test: (1) the court must be “satisfied by the pleadings”;
(2) the party seeking the subpoena must have a “good faith basis” for
the assertion that his or her allegations were actionable; and (3) the
disclosure of the identity must be “centrally needed to advance the
claim.”174 This deferential standard required only that the plaintiff’s
claim be adequately specific, the defendant’s identity be adequately
relevant, and the claim itself be made in “good faith.”
The Rocker Management LLC v. John Does 1–20175 court took a
stance far less deferential to plaintiffs than the standards of
Seescandy and America Online.176 The court used a totality-of-thecircumstances test to assess the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.177 The
court noted the “grammar and spelling errors” on the forum in which
the allegedly tortious statements had been posted, and it highlighted
a forum warning message that postings therein were solely users’
opinions.178 Based on these findings, the court determined that a
reasonable reader would not interpret the John Doe’s forum posts to
have been factual assertions and, as such, the claim for libel could
not be successful.179 The defendants’ identities remained
undisclosed.180 Rocker heavily favors defendants by increasing the
threshold requirements that the plaintiff must meet.181
The first standard to include an explicit balancing test and a
notice provision was set forth in Dendrite International v. Doe, No.
3.182 In Dendrite, the anonymous poster had posted purportedly
inside information about a company on an online message board.183
The court dismissed the “good faith” approach of America Online
and laid out a four-part “sufficient evidence” approach.184 Under this
new approach, plaintiffs must first make an effort to notify the John
Doe of the pending subpoena and allow sufficient time for the
174. America Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8.
175. No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003).
176. Id. at *3.
177. Id. at *2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *2–3.
180. Id. at *3 (granting motion to quash subpoena seeking disclosure of defendants’
identities).
181. Id.
182. 775 A.2d 756, 759–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
183. Id. at 762–63, 767.
184. Lynch, supra note 40, at 21–22.
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defendant to file an opposition.185 As an example, the court suggested
that posting the notice on the message board where the offensive
content had initially appeared would be sufficient.186 Second,
plaintiffs must present to the court the exact statements allegedly
made by the anonymous poster.187 Third, like in Seescandy,
plaintiffs’ pleadings must be able to survive a motion to dismiss;
however, a greater showing is required under Dendrite than is
required under Seescandy.188 Under Dendrite, plaintiffs must produce
“sufficient evidence” in support of each prima facie claim.189 Finally,
the court weighs the necessity for identity disclosure in light of each
plaintiff’s case against each defendant’s First Amendment interest in
anonymity.190 In applying this standard to the case, the Dendrite court
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence and,
as such, the court would not compel disclosure of the defendant’s
identity.191 Dendrite, like Rocker, favors anonymous defendants. It
allows courts to consider concerns not addressed by earlier standards
and permits judicial flexibility in determining a proper balance,
particularly in the face of “rapidly evolving technology.”192 Courts
have frequently used the Dendrite test to bar plaintiffs’ actions
against John Does.193
The fifth standard—and the third one that heavily favors speaker
anonymity—was established in Doe v. Cahill.194 The court refused to
adopt an approach similar to that in America Online or Seescandy,
finding that the standards they set forth were “too easily satisfied” to
adequately protect anonymous speech.195 Instead, the court adopted a
standard akin to that in Dendrite, but made it a two-prong test,
combining the balancing and disclosure-of-allegedly-tortious185. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 760–61.
191. Id. at 771.
192. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 340.
193. Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 714–15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (holding that
government officials failed to meet their burden, required by Dendrite, so as to compel disclosure
of the defendants responsible for potentially defamatory political speech).
194. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
195. Id. at 458.
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statements prongs into the sufficient-evidence prong of Dendrite.196
The Cahill court articulated its two-prong test as a summary
judgment standard. The first prong is a notice requirement akin to
that in Dendrite, and the second prong requires the plaintiff to
present sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary
judgment for each element of his or her claim—a “sufficiency of
evidence” standard.197 The court also made an exception for prima
facie elements that would be nearly impossible to prove without
disclosing the defendant’s identity, such as the malicious-intent
element required in a public figure’s defamation claim.198 The Cahill
test, like that of Dendrite, weighs so heavily in favor of protecting
anonymous speech that it seriously hinders the protection of Internet
users who are victims of identity misappropriation.
Most courts have adopted a John Doe subpoena standard that is
balanced heavily in favor of the anonymous online speaker, such as
the Dendrite “sufficient evidence” standard or the Cahill “summary
judgment” standard.199 For example, in Krinsky v. Doe 6,200 the court
used a hybrid Cahill-Dendrite standard.201 The court recognized that
the notice prong, as expressed in Cahill, may now be “unrealistic and
unprofitable” given the nature of today’s Internet and given that an
ISP will often notify the Doe defendant, as in Krinsky, when it
receives a request for his or her identity.202 The court also noted that
there was too much variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the
application of Cahill’s summary judgment standard and, instead,
applied a standard requiring “a prima facie showing of the elements”
strong enough to overcome a motion to quash the subpoena seeking
disclosure of the defendant’s identity.203
These efforts to delineate a comprehensive standard for John
Doe subpoenas attempt to balance multiple concerns. When courts
196. Id. at 461.
197. Id. at 463.
198. Id. at 462–63.
199. Lynch, supra note 40, at 26. But see Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934,
2008 WL 5192386, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008) (utilizing an America Online–type “good
faith” standard but adding a comparative prong where the plaintiff must provide “information
sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source”).
200. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008).
201. Id. at 244–45.
202. Id. at 244.
203. Id. at 245.
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use a standard that too heavily favors one side or the other, they risk
eliminating the non-favored rights.204 Weak protections for
anonymity may allow plaintiffs to undertake “extra-judicial self-help
remedies” after unmasking defendants.205 Conversely, granting
anonymity too much deference will immunize defendants, eliminate
deterrence, and leave plaintiffs powerless.206 Courts consider
anonymity most critical in circumstances such as “governmental
whistle blowing; labor organizing; dissident movements in repressive
countries; gay and lesbian issues; and resources dealing with
addiction, alcoholism, diseases and spousal abuse,” as well as where
the speech at issue contributes to important public debate.207 Any
standard designed to protect anonymous speech online should be
particularly tailored to protect these kinds of speech. Protection
covering speech outside of these particular circumstances, however,
seriously risks eliminating a plaintiff’s ability to fight against
anonymous speech that is used to terrorize and harass.
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
A. Walled Garden to Web 2.0
ISPs and OSPs hold the key to individual autonomy in online
identity construction. They have the power and capacity to control
the flow and distribution of information online. Indeed, Congress
designed the CDA to facilitate freedom for ISPs with this very fact in
mind. However, the CDA was passed in 1996, and Zeran was
decided in 1997. Since then, the Internet landscape has vastly
changed, and the nature of ISP and OSP control over online
information flow has changed with it. The expansive Zeran
interpretation of CDA immunity no longer effectively upholds
Congress’s purpose in passing the act. The Internet of the 1990s was
ISP-driven, self-contained, “read only,” and accessible only to a
minority of the population. Today’s Internet is ubiquitous,
interactive, user-driven, and integral to societal participation in
204. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the CDA
plainly immunizes ISPs and OSPs from liability for information that originated with third
parties).
205. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
206. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334.
207. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 329 (citations omitted).
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political, professional, financial, and social realms. As a result, it is
imperative that ISPs and OSPs be subject to limited distributor
liability—lest the law be read to incentivize lawlessness online.
Only 36 million people worldwide—0.9 percent of the world’s
population—used the Internet in 1996, the year the CDA was
enacted.208 Today, there are over 227 million Internet users in the
United States alone, 77.3 percent of the U.S. population.209 During
this period of rapid growth, the Internet has changed in both size and
structure. When the CDA was passed, the online landscape’s
structure was described as the walled garden web.210 That is, the
browsing environment of the 1990s “control[led] the information and
Web sites the user [wa]s able to access.”211 ISPs like CompuServe
and AOL provided a self-contained environment within which users
could surf.212 The ISPs designed their systems and services to direct
users to supported content, creating a self-contained, walled-like
network of webpages and applications within which most users
remained throughout their online experience213 At AOL’s peak,
85 percent of its subscribers never left the confines of AOL’s
“garden.”214 On such services, web users “observed, found, and
exchanged content passively . . . and privately, e.g., by emailing or
engaging in person-to-person instant messages.”215
By contrast, today’s Internet is highly searchable, very versatile,
and extremely interactive. The advent of broadband brought down
the walled garden dial-up system of Internet provision. Unlike ISPs
of the walled garden era, broadband companies seek to provide
Internet access alone, divorced from regulating or providing

208. Internet
Growth
Statistics,
INTERNET
WORLD
STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
209. Internet Usage and Population in North America, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm (last visited June 30, 2010).
210. Walled Garden, WEBOPEDIA.COM, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/walled_
garden.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
211. Id.
212. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 166, 183–84.
213. Id. at 167.
214. Richard Williamson, Net Revolution Poised to Pounce on TV, ZDNET AUSTRALIA
(Apr. 5, 2001), http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/business/soa/Net-revolution-poised-to-pounce-onTV/
0,139023166,120213824,00.htm.
215. Ziniti, supra note 122, at 590.
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content.216 They place few limits on the content accessible to users.
Also, through broadband, the Internet is accessible twenty-four hours
a day. In 2007, over 50 percent of U.S. households had broadband
service,217 and 79 percent of adults went online for an average of
eleven hours a week.218 These numbers have only increased.219
Phenomena such as blogging and social networking, as well as web
services like Google, YouTube, and Wikipedia, have revolutionized
the way Internet content is created, organized, collected, and viewed
and the way online communities are formed and developed.
Additionally, hardware, such as iPhones and Blackberries, have
made the Internet portable and accessible in ways unanticipated
fifteen years ago.
This interactive Internet environment, dubbed “Web 2.0,”220
“specializes in [building] community” through its services.221 It is
designed to “harness network effects” and improve as more people
participate.222 In contrast to ISPs’ services in the walled garden era,
Web 2.0 services are usually in the form of websites created and
maintained by users and OSPs rather than in the form of content and
sites created and maintained by the broadband ISPs themselves.223
Additionally, Web 2.0 user interaction is increasingly public. Even
one-to-one interactions are recorded and broadcast for public
comment and collection by other users.224 Users broadcast their realworld whereabouts and activities in real time from mobile devices
and personal computers.225 They create profile pages describing
216. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 173.
217. Stan Beer, U.S. Residential Broadband Penetration to Exceed 50% in 2007, ITWIRE
(Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.itwire.com/it-industry-news/market/9666-us-residential-broadbandpenetration-to-exceed-50-in-2007.
218. Solarina Ho, Poll Finds Nearly 80 Percent of U.S. Adults Go Online, REUTERS (Nov. 5,
2007, 8:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN0559828420071106.
219. Lance Whitney, Average Net User Now Online 13 Hours Per Week, CNET NEWS
(Dec. 23, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10421016-93.html (citing polls
finding that 80 percent of adults go online 13 hours per week).
220. O’Reilly, supra note 3.
221. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 179.
222. Tim O’Reilly, Web 2.0 and Cloud Computing, O’REILLY RADAR (Oct. 26, 2008),
http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/10/web-20-and-cloud-computing.html.
223. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 179; Ziniti, supra note 122, at 590.
224. How News Feed Works, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=408 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
225. What Is Twitter?, THEPICKY.COM, http://www.thepicky.com/internet/what-is-twitterfeatures (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
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themselves and their activities,226 and they join networks that link
them to professional connections where they can be rated and
promoted to others.227 They broadcast and rate their consumption of
books, movies, and other media on sites that track users’ likes and
dislikes. Applications on these sites make automated
recommendations based on users’ tastes, and send this information
along to participating friends and connections.228 The rise of Web 2.0
has revolutionized not only the mode of interaction and expression
online but also the very nature and function of users’ online
identities.
In the walled garden web, user identity, at best, comprised a
“crabbed description,” no more than a collection of statements or
statistics.229 It was far from the “highly nuanced and richly
instantiated selves we experience in more social and interactive . . .
environments.”230 The online identities of Web 2.0 users are much
more akin to and have many more implications on our real-world
identities than the walled garden Internet for which the Zeran
protections were sufficient. One’s online persona can be accessed by
and has influence on one’s social network, including friends, family,
and acquaintances, as well as one’s professional network, including
colleagues, clients, employers and employees—both current and
potential (in many fields, a clean and prominent Internet presence is
essential for professional success).231 A person’s online persona is
also accessible by and influential on advertisers, businesses, and
various personalized service applications that are designed to
integrate with and particularize to a person’s identity. As online
226. See Aidan Henry, Is Facebook Replacing E-mail?, MAPPING WEB (July 11, 2007),
http://www.mappingtheweb.com/2007/07/11/facebook-email.
227. See LinkedIn, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LinkedIn (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
228. See, e.g., AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (making
customized
purchasing
suggestions
based
on
users’
tastes);
BLOCKBUSTER,
http://www.blockbuster.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (making customized movie suggestions
based on users’ tastes); NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (making
customized movie recommendations based on users’ tastes).
229. Susan P. Crawford, Who’s in Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 211, 214 (2004).
230. Beth Simon Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the
Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1733, 1746 (2005).
231. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 154 (“[A]n increasing number of employers now use the Internet
to dig up potential dirt on their prospective hires during the interview process.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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identity has become more comprehensive and more closely tied to a
user’s real-world identity, the nature of online identity construction
has remained versatile in its mutability and, therefore, vulnerable to
co-opting, infringement, and fraud.
Congress could not predict the development of the Web 2.0
Internet, and the courts did not consider a system of this kind when
they construed § 230 immunity so broadly. Under the Zeran system,
there are no special provisions or incentives for ISPs or OSPs to
protect the integrity of users’ identities or to facilitate users’ control
over their identities. But ISPs, to some degree, and OSPs, generally,
provide services that encourage and trade off of individualized user
networking, socializing, and identity data collecting.232 The outcome
of broad immunity is that ISPs and OSPs, which are in the best
position to control takedown and editing of user-created content and
identity construction, have little legal incentive to regulate this
content or to protect users. ISPs and OSPs, particularly, benefit
greatly in the Web 2.0 environment by encouraging users to create
and maintain online content;233 yet § 230 immunity continues to
provide them with nearly complete freedom from liability for harm
to users caused by manipulation of their platforms and services.
Users, therefore, bear the burden and cost. Because the general
success of the Web 2.0 Internet depends on user interaction and
participation, Congress’s intention to encourage innovation,
development, and expansion of the online marketplace of ideas is
best served by providing a safe environment for users to control and
develop their online personas without fear of misappropriation. This
could be accomplished by rethinking the courts’ interpretations of
broad ISP immunity and allowing limited protection for users in
particular cases.
B. Online Anonymity Protections
Overbroad immunity, when applied to Web 2.0, facilitates
identity misappropriation like never before. Additionally, wide-

232. Ziniti, supra note 122, at 592 (“Services like photo-sharing and community site Flickr,
or Amazon.com’s community ratings system, take inputs from millions of users in the form of
ratings, tags, and engagement (e.g., via analyzing what and how much users click, comment on,
or forward to their friends) to make the online experience better.”).
233. Id. at 592–93 (giving as an example, “services like Google’s AdSense, which enables
anyone with a blog to make money by hosting Google ads on it”).
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reaching protections for online anonymity embolden identity
appropriators and harassers, as these perpetrators are not called to
account for the repercussions of their actions.234 The pairing of these
features has led to increased levels of harassment.235 Likewise,
perpetrators’ exclusively virtual encounters with their victims—
many never meet their victims in real life—make the victims appear
to harassers as mere images for manipulation.236 These factors are
exacerbating harassment online. This increase in online harassment
is compounded by the lack of uniformity in John Doe subpoena law
and the resulting difficulty in identifying and holding anonymous
Internet actors liable under the prevalent standards discussed supra
Part II.C.
In addition to the legal difficulty in obtaining a subpoena, there
is a technical hurdle to overcome as well. Many ISPs and OSPs only
store IP addresses—which could be necessary to identify a John
Doe—for a period of sixty days or so.237 This limited time frame
requires a victim to act very quickly against a misappropriator if the
victim hopes to compel the misappropriator’s identification. It might
help remedy this issue to instate a liability scheme against ISPs and
OSPs that would enforce procedures for (1) notice and takedown of
infringing posts and (2) longer-term maintenance of IP addresses for
users. Takedown procedures would also help preserve online
anonymity, because plaintiffs would be less likely to undertake the
difficult process of seeking to unmask third-party posters if they had
a more immediate remedy.238
At the time of the walled garden Internet, anonymity was a
bedrock aspect of Internet culture.239 A culture of anonymity and
234. Citron, supra note 29, at 83.
235. Michele L. Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated Distress Related to
1169
(2006),
available
at
Internet
Harassment,
118
PEDIATRICS
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/118/4/e1169 (“[T]here has been a
significant increase in the prevalence of Internet harassment from 2000 to 2005.”); Oldest Online
Safety Organization Discloses Current Cyberstalking Statistics, NET CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS
BLOG (Apr. 29, 2009, 11:32 AM), http://www.netcrimes.net/2009/04/oldest-online-safetyorganization.html (“Both Male and Female harassers in 2008 were about dead even for the 2nd
year in a row[.] In 2008 an increase in victims aged 18–30, from 28% to 35%, was seen while
41+ aged victims increased from 29% to 32%[.]”).
236. Citron, supra note 29, at 83.
237. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 43.
238. See supra Part II.C.
239. Lee Tien, Symposium: Innovation and the Information Environment: Who’s Afraid of
Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 126–27 (1996).
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pseudonymity—focused on “representation” rather than on
“reputation”—predominated, and real-world identity was
downplayed.240 Because online identity is as alienable as it is
mutable, Internet users may have a variety of different identities
online, embedding themselves in different groups and playing
different roles.241 However, there has been a shift away from this
culture in the Web 2.0 environment, which has been largely driven
by technological advances.242 Software capabilities now go beyond
the “mere naming conventions” typical of walled garden identity
builders, such that individuals can now “create positive and robust”
online personas.243 Thus, the modern focus of online identity is
reputation because reputation integrates peoples’ online and offline
identities.
Where courts administer tougher standards for John Doe
subpoenas, they do so in the name of protecting free speech online.244
But the freedom to speak anonymously should not be the only free
speech consideration. The potential chilling effect on online speech
that may result from weaker protections for anonymity is not more
problematic than are the chilling effects on online speech that may
result from weak protections for those who had chosen to speak
using their own voices in their real-world identities. Just as an
individual’s right to speak anonymously is integral to his or her
freedom of speech, so too is his or her right to open self-expression.
He or she should not be forced to speak anonymously nor be subject
to someone else putting words in his or her mouth.
Also, anonymity can have negative effects on speech. One
school of thought holds that people are more prone to behave
aggressively when they believe they cannot be seen or will not be
caught.245 This tendency has led to aggressive online harassment that
targets women, children, and minority groups. It has also led victims
to leave Internet discourse or resign their identities online (real or
pseudonymous) and take on anonymity.246 As some scholars have
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Noveck, supra note 230, at 1751.
Id. at 1746–47.
Id. at 1751.
Id.
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
Citron, supra note 29, at 81–82.
Id. at 82, 85.
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argued, the right to anonymous speech may be “better termed a
‘qualified privilege.’”247 Anonymous speech whose primary purpose
is to impede or eliminate others’ rights to self-expression should not
be privileged.248 Because proper functioning of the Web 2.0 Internet
depends on users maintaining consistent identities, with many users
using their real-world identities for this purpose, the freedom to
speak anonymously online must be weighed against the needs of
Web 2.0 users to manage and control the consistency of their online
presence and self-expression. In some circumstances, other rights
outweigh the right to anonymity. Here, it should be outweighed by
the individual’s right to speak with his or her own voice and
preserved online by securing such individuals’ integrity of identity.
C. Victim Recourse Under Current Law
Misuse and misappropriation of identity are common tactics in
online harassment.249 Harassers gain access to personal and
personally identifying information, either through Web searches of
publicly accessible information or through actual invasions of
privacy, by hacking into victims’ computers or email accounts.250 The
acquired information is then posted online, either in a tone
purporting that the harasser is the individual whose information is
being posted, or in a way that otherwise invites third parties to
misuse or misappropriate the information or correlating identity.251
Once the victim discovers such a posting, he or she must contact the
ISP or site OSP to request that the post be taken down.252 The victim
is then subject to the whim of the ISP or OSP with respect to
removal. Furthermore, unless the OSP’s actions or the victim’s claim
fits within very limited exceptions that vary by jurisdiction, the OSP
is immune from liability for the post and for any failure to remove it.
Meanwhile, the posted material remains active, exposing the victim
to further danger from and harassment by third parties. During this
time, “[v]ictims feel a sustained loss of personal security and
247. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 327 (noting that the right to anonymity “is better termed a
‘qualified privilege’”).
248. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 166 (2008).
249. See Citron, supra note 29, at 61, 63–64.
250. Id. at 70.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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regularly dismantle their online presence[s] to avoid further
devastation of their privacy.”253
For recourse against an anonymous poster, a victim must first
contact the OSP for the website where the material was initially
posted. The victim must request identifying information (if any was
taken) or the IP address of the poster in hopes of tracing it to the
poster’s real-world identity.254 The OSP may not have identifying
information for the third-party poster, as OSPs are not obligated to
retain this information. If the OSP does have the information the
victim must compel its disclosure by court order through filing for a
John Doe subpoena.255 A court will not issue this subpoena unless it
determines that the victim can meet one of the various standards of
review, depending on the rule in that jurisdiction.
At this point, if not before, the anonymous poster will be given
notice of the victim’s efforts to unmask him or her, and he or she will
have an opportunity to respond with an opposition brief to quash the
subpoena. The court will then make another determination on the
subpoena. If is the court issues the subpoena, the victim may proceed
on various tort grounds against the poster. Until this time, however,
the victim will have no recourse for his or her injury, and he or she
will have no leverage to remove the offending post.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Online Right to Autonomy of Identity
An individual’s interest in “autonomous self-definition” is a
central issue to any solution posed by cases like Barnes.256 In this
respect, the right of publicity is the only right to autonomy of identity
that courts have recognized as an exception to § 230 immunity.257 But
to fall within this exception, a victim must show that the misuse or
misappropriation of the victim’s identity was made “for purposes of
trade or advertising.”258 This severe limitation on the scope of
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See McKenna, supra note 70, at 231 (analyzing the history and reasoning behind the
right to privacy and concluding that “[a]ll individuals have a legitimate interest in autonomous
self-definition”).
257. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 303 (D.N.H. 2008).
258. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307, 308 (N.Y. 1984).
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infringement for which a victim can recover does not adequately
account for the “emotional and economic” costs borne by victims
whose interests in autonomous self-definition have been violated.259
Though the state-law right of publicity as it stands today is
inadequate to sufficiently protect user identity, the historical and
theoretical underpinnings of the right of publicity tend to justify a
right to autonomous self-definition.260 Moreover, the nature of the
Web 2.0 environment necessitates a limited recognition of this right
in order to protect the Internet users’ safety and interests and to
uphold Congress’s intent in passing § 230—to protect the integrity,
vitality, and diversity of the online community.
Since 1890 when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first
proposed that the right to privacy ought to be protected, it has
become “one of the broadest concepts in the law,” supporting a wide
array of interests and fostering little consensus as to its meaning as a
legal concept.261 Unfortunately, courts have viewed identity
misappropriation through the lens of privacy. As a result, they have
considered it in light of Warren and Brandeis’s initial premise that
the right to privacy found its basis in the individual’s fundamental
interest in being “let alone.”262 However, claims regarding identity
misappropriation are ill suited to this theoretical basis. Victims of
identity misappropriation are not typically trying to be let alone to
hide from public view. Rather, a victim is typically seeking to create
a public image that the misappropriation undermines or
contradicts.263 It was this kind of discrepancy that led to the creation
of the right of publicity to begin with, in that being let alone did not
fit the goals of public figures who were simultaneously seeking
publicity in their own right.264
The right of publicity was premised on a theory analogizing
one’s right in one’s identity to a property right.265 However, property
theory cannot adequately justify the right of publicity, as celebrity is

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

McKenna, supra note 70, at 229.
Id. at 229, 232–33.
Id. at 238–39.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 67, at 193.
See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941).
McKenna, supra note 70, at 228.
Id. at 234–35.
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not a scarce resource in need of protection.266 Likewise, labor
theories “overstate an individual’s role in the creation of any
economic value in his or her public persona,”267 and the appropriation
of a celebrity’s identity may be no more likely to exhaust the value
of his or her identity than it is to increase the value.268 After all, as the
adage states, all publicity is good publicity. Additionally, courts
often apply the right of publicity in instances where plaintiffs have
done nothing to cultivate their personas’ economic value and do not
have an economic interest in exploiting whatever value their
personas may hold.269 For these reasons, application of the right of
publicity seems to be predicated not so much on the appropriation of
economic value in identity but on appropriation of identity itself. If
so, its key theoretical underpinning seems to be a right of autonomy
of identity.270
Claims such as those in Barnes and Perfect 10, Inc. should be
premised on this fundamental theory. In those cases, the harm caused
to the victim was not simply economic: it was harm to functional
reputation, to the right of self-expression, to personal safety and
security, and to the ability to participate freely online without
obstruction. Furthermore, those harms did not stem solely from the
fraudulent posts themselves but also from the failures to effectively
remove them from the Internet. ISPs and OSPs today make money
from Web 2.0’s identity-based participatory structure but do not
shoulder their share of the burden in terms of liability.271 Courts
should adopt a policy with respect to ISP immunity that recognizes
the right to autonomy of identity as a state intellectual property
exception like the right of publicity. This would maximize protection
for victims and shift some of the burden to protect against
infringement onto those in the best position to remedy its harm

266. Id. at 273–74.
267. Id. at 252.
268. Id. at 265 (providing an excellent and thorough analysis).
269. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (D.N.H. 2008)
(allowing a claim for violation of the right of publicity for a plaintiff who did not trade off of her
identity or image).
270. McKenna, supra note 70, at 229.
271. Ziniti, supra note 122, at 593, 595.

Winter 2011]

IDENTITY ONLINE

743

through takedown. Such recognition would ensure better protection
for online speech,272 Internet participation, and Internet development.
B. Limited Exception to ISP Distributor Liability
Protection for the integrity of user identity is essential to Internet
development and the development of other related interactive media
and technology in the Web 2.0 era.273 Likewise, protections for
“online discourse” and “cultural development,”274 which go hand in
hand with protections against stalking and harassment online, are
dependent on protection of user identity in Web 2.0.275 Therefore, for
courts to accomplish Congress’s stated intention for § 230, they must
rethink the Zeran interpretation of § 230.276
Attempts to roll back § 230 immunity in order to remedy its
inadequate protection have rarely been upheld277 and have been
decried by commentators as a “deviation from the clearly stated
goals of [the] statute and the accompanying consistent judicial
interpretation.”278 Such commentary regards any encroachment on
broad § 230 immunity as an affront to the beneficial policy of
Internet exceptionalism, presumed to be central to the congressional
policy underlying the CDA.279 Such criticism, however, overlooks
the fact that courts initially granted broadened immunity that
encompassed distributor liability as an expansion beyond the bounds
272. Citron, supra note 29, at 83, 97 (“One of free speech’s most important functions is
promoting individual autonomy.”).
273. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
274. Noveck, supra note 230, at 1733, 1750 (noting that a “robust online identity . . . is
essential to successful commerce and society online”).
275. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
276. Ziniti, supra note 122, at 601 (“Courts could implement a knowledge-triggered liability
system without congressional action by reverting to the common law distributor liability
standard.”).
277. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 142 (Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that an ISP
ought to be subject to liability as a distributor when the ISP has been given notice of a tortious
posting and has received a request to remove it, but has failed to do so), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510
(2006).
278. Defterderia, supra note 147, at 579 (reasoning that Congress intentionally chose to
relieve ISPs from the liability scheme applicable to their real-world publisher and distributor
counterparts because such liability would be potentially damaging to the continued growth and
development of the Internet).
279. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG
(Mar. 11,
2009,
12:20PM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/
the_third_wave.htm (defining Internet exceptionalism as a policy of “crafting internet specific
laws that diverge from regulatory precedents in other media”).
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of the statutory language of § 230 for the purpose of accomplishing
congressional intent.280 However, Congress did not necessarily intend
this expansion.281 As such, a rollback of broad immunity, bringing
the breadth of ISP immunity more in line with the statutory language
of § 230, would accomplish Congress’s initial stated intent and
respect congressional authority. Indeed, minor exceptions to broad
§ 230 immunity do not sufficiently protect Internet users’ identities.
Only wholesale elimination of immunity for notice-based distributor
liability in those circumstances where a victim’s identity has been
co-opted will effectively protect victims of identity misappropriation.
Therefore, courts ought to recognize a particular exception from
the general rule interpreting § 230 as immunizing ISPs and OSPs
against distributor liability. ISPs and OSPs should be subject to
notice-based liability for negligence in cases where (1) a third-party
poster fraudulently misappropriates another user’s identity and
makes a post as that individual (not merely about that individual);282
(2) the user whose identity has been subjected to misappropriation
has given the ISP or OSP notice that the posting is reasonably
viewed as a misappropriation of his or her identity; and (3) the user
requested that the posting be taken down. Critics may argue that any
opening in ISP and OSP liability for third-party posting will chill
online discourse,283 yet other nations, such as Britain and Ireland, do
not offer immunity to ISPs, and those countries still benefit from
“vibrant online discourse.”284
Also, a distinction must be drawn between OSPs, which have
control over the content on a particular website, and ISPs, such as
broadband providers, which function more like common carriers and
do not directly control webpages or platforms for public-content
posting. ISPs that function like common carriers should not be
280. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
281. Id. (“Because the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech
and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes, we will
not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact.”).
282. However, violations should include the posting of personal data, such as personal contact
information, a Social Security number, or credit card numbers, that subjects an individual to realworld danger.
283. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101, 112 (2007) (noting of the reasoning behind immunity that “if Internet
intermediaries were liable every time someone posted problematic content . . . the resulting threat
of liability . . . would debilitate the Internet”).
284. Citron, supra note 29, at 120 (citation omitted).
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subject to distributor liability because Congress’s intent would not be
furthered by removing Zeran immunity in these cases. However,
because OSPs control content and are in the best position to protect
Internet users from prolonged harm to their rights to autonomous
self-definition and integrity of identity, OSPs ought to have a duty to
take down the content in a reasonable amount of time. This duty
should arise where the OSP has actual knowledge that material is
reasonably infringing and the victim provides notice to the OSP.285
The requirement that the victim provide notice to the OSP will
safeguard OSPs against a duty to police every claimed violation and
will ensure that the victim is, in fact, taking an active role in the
construction and maintenance of his or her online identity. Lastly, a
safe-harbor provision limiting this liability should also be enforced,
though this may require congressional action, as no such provision is
written into the CDA.
C. Notice and Takedown Safe-Harbor Provision
Although, under the current system, a victim of identity
misappropriation may bring suit directly against the third-party
poster as recourse for damage done, such recourse has become
increasingly difficult for reasons beyond those already discussed.
There is software now on the market that allows users to “hide (or in
the alternative, continuously change) their IP addresses.”286 As use of
such software increases, a plaintiff’s ability to unmask an anonymous
poster may become nearly impossible. Even without this
technological advance, a third-party poster can avoid detection and
eliminate the possibility of recourse against him or her by posting the
material from a computer that does not identify him or her.287
Likewise, even when a victim obtains a subpoena, unmasks and
successfully sues the third-party poster, the harm will not have been
eliminated because the post will have already been spread online
over search archives, Internet caches, or in the original post (when
the OSP refuses to dismantle it).288 Because such posts remain
285. It is important to note that the requirement of both actual knowledge and proper notice
protects OSPs from liability where they had reason to know but did not receive proper notice, as
warned against in Ziniti, supra note 122, at 601.
286. Quarmby, supra note 78, at 291–92.
287. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (D.N.H. 2008).
288. Citron, supra note 29, at 83, 84 (“Their refusal can stem from a libertarian ‘You Own
Your Own Words’ philosophy, or irresponsibility bred from the belief that they enjoy broad
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viewable, they can, as in Barnes, serve as a “call[] to action” for
more harassment.289 Therefore, even successful suits for damages
against third-party posters will seldom be adequate remedies for
victims. Furthermore, studies have shown that most plaintiffs would
prefer to simply have the offending posts removed than to get money
damages.290 Seventy-five percent of libel plaintiffs say they would
have refrained from litigation if they had received a retraction,
correction, or apology.291 Therefore, enforceable means of identity
protection that require OSPs to take down identity-misappropriating
posts would be more effective to remedy online infringement than
the current suit-for-damages system.
Such a system would require limited notice-based liability for
OSPs. However, liability for failure to take down posts should trigger
only when the notice has been properly provided. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) serves as a good model for
determining appropriate notice.292 Under the DMCA, a copyright
holder must give written notification of claimed copyright
infringement, identify the copyrighted work, identify the material
claimed to be infringed, provide contact information for the
copyright holder/victim, give a statement of good faith belief, and
include a signature and statement of accuracy under penalty of
perjury.293 Here, similar criteria for giving notice would be effective.
As a preliminary matter, OSPs should be obligated to provide a
means of contact by which notice can be filed. Only the victim or his
or her agent should file notice with the OSP. The victim should be
obligated to fill out a form certifying, on penalty of perjury, that (1)
the victim is the individual whose identity has been appropriated in
the offending post; (2) the victim has a good faith belief that the
material in question has served to misappropriate his or her identity;
and (3) the information in the victim’s notification is accurate to the
statutory immunity from liability.”); see also id. at 74 (citing the AutoAdmit case, Ciolli v.
Iravani, No. 2:08-cv-02601, 2008 WL 4412053 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2008) (AutoAdmit), where “a
site manager asserted that he would not remove the offensive threads until the female students
apologized for threatening litigation”).
289. Id. at 84.
290. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 238.
291. Id.; see also id. at 189 (“[S]eventy-five percent [of defamation plaintiffs] are motivated
by non-monetary factors.”).
292. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
293. Id.
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best of his or her knowledge. The victim should identify the
particular elements of the post that arguably appropriate his or her
identity and should therefore be removed. These specifications
should be reasonably sufficient to permit the OSP to locate the
material. The victim should offer reasonable documentation of how
the elements of the post infringe on his or her identity. He or she
should offer contact information reasonably sufficient to allow the
OSP to contact him or her. If the OSP receives such notice, it would
then have a reasonable duty of care to take down the offending post.
Failure to exercise this reasonable duty of care should result in
liability. Reasonable efforts to take down the offending material
should result in safe harbor and immunity from suit. Of course, not
all Internet media have easily manageable content.294 For this reason,
an OSP ought to be held only to a reasonable standard of care to
make efforts to remove the infringing post in a reasonable time after
receiving notice.
D. Safeguards Against Misuse
Scholars have noted that notice-and-takedown regimes such as
ones like the DMCA’s “have not worked well” because they may
“sweep too broadly,” causing OSPs to take down postings simply to
avoid liability.295 Likewise, OSPs may lose a good deal of time and
money investigating complaints.296 Such concerns are misplaced with
respect to this proposed system, however, because they are narrowly
drawn and personally driven. OSPs have no duty to remove simple
references to an individual, nor are they duty-bound to remove
allegedly defamatory postings that do not have third parties posing as
the victim or giving out sensitive personal information. Also,
individuals protecting their personal identities generally have less
time and money than corporations protecting their intellectual
property have. Individuals are therefore less likely to submit proper
takedown requests to ISPs and OSPs for minor or questionable
violations.
Additional concerns with requiring OSP responsibility for
takedowns crop up with respect to identity misappropriation claims

294. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 253–54.
295. Citron, supra note 29, at 122.
296. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 260.
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that stem from postings on sites that operate without a central
administrator who has complete control over the website.297 In such
instances, the OSP is not in a position to easily remove infringing
material. These concerns are alleviated by the fact that an OSP is
only obligated to make a reasonable effort to remove the offending
material.
E. Limiting Online Anonymity
OSP liability and a notice-and-takedown system would not
completely alleviate the problem faced in Barnes, however. Because
of the speed with which information spreads across the Internet, it is
sometimes difficult to completely eliminate a harmful post.298 For
this reason, it is also important to place limitations on Internet
anonymity. To this end, ISPs and OSPs should be obligated to trace
identifying information on each anonymous poster. This way, online
anonymity could be preserved while the destructive actions resulting
from the lack of accountability in anonymity would be held in
check.299
The technology for tracking anonymous Internet posters is
already available and being used by ISPs and OSPs. ISPs routinely
keep records of IP addresses for users.300 In addition to IP addresses,
many websites use a software component called a “cookie.”301
Because IP addresses often change, many OSPs use cookies to track
users who access their sites from the same computer at different
times.302 Between cookies and IP-address tracking, the technological
framework is in place for tracking anonymous posters. However,
ISPs and OSPs are not obligated to collect and store this information
for any particular length of time, and there is no guarantee that an
anonymous user will be traceable. ISPs and OSPs should be
obligated to retain this information for a definite period of time and
should be liable for the loss of this information when a John Doe
297. Id. at 261.
298. Id. at 260–61.
299. Citron, supra note 29, at 124.
300. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005).
301. Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for
the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 87–88 (2002) (noting that
cookie software tracks user identity by communications from the website’s server to the user’s
Internet browser and back again).
302. Id.
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subpoena has issued so that there would be appropriate limits on
anonymity. Such limits would abate the perception that harassers are
untouchable.
In addition to obligatory ISP and OSP retention of user-identity
data, Congress should establish a uniform system for issuing John
Doe subpoenas. However, until this is accomplished, the takedown
provisions for identity misappropriation that are suggested in this
Note should satisfy even the more stringent Dendrite standard. Due
to obligations on ISPs and OSPs, identity would be traceable in the
case of alleged identity misappropriation. Thus, ISPs and OSPs
would be able to give notice to a Doe defendant facing a subpoena.
Likewise, if a plaintiff has issued appropriate notice and request for
removal, then the notice, the sworn statement, and the additional
information collected and presented to the OSP should support the
claim against the Doe defendant.
Perhaps the greatest objection to traceable anonymity is that it
constitutes de facto elimination of anonymity online and results in
the hindrance of free speech. While this objection has merit, the
methods and technology involved with tracing identity are already in
place. The only change this Note suggests is a statutory obligation
that ISPs and OSPs retain the information they are already tracking.
Such an obligation may place a higher burden on smaller OSPs that
allow third-party posting but do not actually track IP or cookie
information. For these smaller OSPs, there are alternative methods
for tracing identity. Many sites require registration by email in order
to post. Such registration would suffice.
Violating a user’s right to privacy online is the other great
concern with imposing an obligation on ISPs and OSPs to collect
information that could be used to create records of online activity.
However, as Justice Douglas recognized, “[o]ne who enters any
public place sacrifices some of his privacy.”303 Obligating ISPs and
OSPs to retain identity-tracing data does not obligate them to track
user activity or collect users’ personal information. Most information
gathered using cookies and IP addresses is anonymous because these
do not convey any personal information in their own right.304

303. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
304. Keck, supra note 301, at 90.
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V. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE STEPS
This Note’s proposals would require courts to overrule the
Zeran interpretation of distributor liability. This revision would
require no action by Congress because congressional intent with the
CDA is already clear; it was the judiciary that first drew a broad line
around all ISP liability from § 230. Coverage of distributor liability
is not addressed in § 230, and policy considerations favor eliminating
immunity in the limited case of negligence for OSPs that, after
notice, fail to remove identity-misappropriating material. Thus,
courts would have discretion to distinguish ISPs that are like
common carriers from OSPs that regulate content. While
requirements for reasonable notice and takedown in these cases
could also come from the courts, Congress or state legislatures are
better suited to the task.
This proposal’s other elements require legislative action.
Congress should obligate ISPs and OSPs to retain identity-tracing
records. Such legislation would serve a number of purposes,
including many beyond this Note’s scope. The statute should place a
duty of care on ISPs to retain basic identification records for a
reasonable period of time. This duty would only attach to ISPs that
permit third-party posting and only apply to those users who post
content online. Such additions would fill the void left by Internet
exceptionalism in protecting online identity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Changes in Internet technology and culture have led to an online
environment wherein user identity is an integral part and a driving
force in the Internet’s discourse and development. As a result, it is
imperative that courts rethink their approaches to CDA immunity
and roll it back where it disfavors protections for the autonomy of
Internet-user identity. Policy considerations—such as protections
against harassment and stalking for users attempting to contribute
and interact online—necessitate limits on online anonymity. ISPs are
in the best position to aid users in regulating their online identities
and to trace users who post infringing material. ISPs are also the
greatest beneficiaries of Web 2.0’s identity-driven system. Therefore,
ISPs must be made to bear a greater portion of the burden to protect
users and maintain an environment of safe interaction online.

